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RECENT DECISIONS
In Allen v. Mendelsohn & Son,14 where a draft payable to plaintiff's
order and mailed to him was stolen en route, and the thief, having forged
plaintiff's endorsement, sold the draft to defendant who in good faith
collected the money from the drawee, the Court held that an action for
money had and received lay against the defendant even though there
was no privity between the parties. The basis for the decision was to
avoid circuity of action. To invoke this doctrine in the principal case
it should appear that the payee (plaintiff) has an action against the
drawer on his engagement, and that the drawer has a cause of action
against the drawee (defendant) for the purchase price of the cattle.
If these two causes exist, then the payee might sue the drawee directly,
but in such an action the drawee should be permitted to assert his de-
fenses against the drawer, as well as the drawer's defenses against the
payee.1 5 Such recovery against the drawee in quasi contract has been
accepted in some cases,1 6 and affords the only legitimate remedy of the
payee of a draft against the drawee when the latter has orally promised
to accept.
RAY ECKSTEIN
Domestic Relations- Commencement of a Divorce Action as In-
terrupting the Statutory Period of Desertion - Plaintiff in 1945, brought
a divorce action and the defendant filed a cross-complaint alleging
grounds for a divorce. On October 16, 1947 the complaint and cross-
complaint were dismissed for want of equity. On October 17, 1947 the
plaintiff in the dismissed case filed suit for a divorce, alleging desertion
since 1945. The lower court found the defendant guilty of desertion
for the required one year period and granted the plaintiff a divorce.
Held: where a suit for divorce is brought and the same is pending be-
tween the parties to the marriage contract, the parties are not only
justified in living apart but must necessarily do so. Such living separate
and apart does not constitute wilful desertion within the meaning of
the Divorce Act. The time so consumed by the litigation cannot be
reckoned in the calculation of the statutory period of desertion. Wilful
desertion for the space of one year during the pendency of the divorce
action was legally impossible. Borin v. Borin, 82 N.E. (2d) 70 (Illinois,
1948).
or upon the estoppel, the effect is to compel the bank to make good its oral
promise to pay the bill, and, under the provisions of sec. 132 of the Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law this cannot be done."
'14207 Ala. 527, 93 So. 416 (1922).
25Midland Say. & Loan Co. v. Tradesmen's National Bank, 57 F. (2d) 868(1932), where the Court said: "The drawee bank when sued by its customer
for paying checks on forged indorsements, could set up as a defense that the
payee had been duly paid." To the same effect: Beeson-Moore Stave Co. v.
Clark County Bank, 160 Ark. 385, 254 S.W. 667 (1923).16 For a collection of these cases, see 31 A.L.R. 1063, and 67 A.L.R. 1535.
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This case is typical of the majority rule that the time of the pen-
dency of a prior divorce action between the parties cannot be counted
as a part of the statutory period of desertion.' The problem can arise
in several ways and varying decisions have been reached in the appli-
cation of the rule. The first instance is illustrated by the principal case
where a divorce action grounded on desertion is brought after having
a previous suit for divorce dismissed within the statutory period re-
quired for desertion. Another situation arises where the deserting spouse
creates by her conduct possible grounds for an immediate divorce, as in
adultery, and the statutory period of desertion has not elapsed. Here the
courts will not allow the dismissal of the action brought on adultery to
prejudice a subsequent suit grounded on desertion as the conduct has
occasioned the suit and the parties are already apart.2 Where the desert-
ing spouse brings a libel for divorce on frivolous or insufficient grounds,
the courts will allow the subsequent desertion suit, on the theory that
a groundless divorce suit is none at all 3
The problem is one essentially of good faith. The elements of de-
sertion include a voluntary separation of one party from the other with-
out justification, for the required period, with the intention of not re-
newing cohabitation or returning to the marital domicile.4 Although
it is possible to secure a divorce on the ground of desertion without the
absence of either spouse, the risk of an adverse decision on the basis
of collusion, connivance, or condonation is always present.5
In line with the general rule, but illustrative of the mathematical
trend of mind of some courts, is the case of Hewitt v. Hewitt6 where
during the statutory period the deserting spouse, in good faith, brought
a separate maintenance action on July 25, 1935 alleging cruel and in-
human treatment. The action was dismissed on November 12, 1935,
and when the statutory period had run, the husband sued for divorce
alleging desertion from March 29, 1934 to August 25, 1936, the date of
the action. The court subtracted the time consumed in the intervening
maintenance suit and granted the divorce. It limited the requirement
for continuous desertion to those cases where a reconciliation which
condones the prior period has taken place. That this result could not
have been reached in Wisconsin can be seen upon examination of the
statutes which provide as a ground for divorce, "The wilful desertion
of one party by the other for the term of one year next preceding the
'Hopkins v. Hopkins, 309 Ill. 160, 77 N.E.(2d) 43 (1948); Palmer v. Palmer,
36 Fla. 385, 18 So. 720 (1895); McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 90 N.J.Eq. 322,
107 Atl. 260 (1919).2 Wagner v. Wagner, 39 Minn. 394, 40 N.W. 360 (1888).
3 Heinemann v. Heinemann, 202 Wis. 639, 233 N.W. 552 (1930).4
KEEzER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, p. 243.
5 Graves v. Graves, 88 Miss. 677, 41 So. 384 (1906).6120 W.Va. 151, 197 S.E. 297 (1938).
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commencement of the action".7 In pertinent language on the subject
the New Hampshire court in Easter v. Easter said, "One honestly
prosecuting a supposedly sound suit for divorce cannot be guilty of de-
sertion while so engaged; and one charged with offenses which imply
the consent of the other to a separation cannot be charged with deser-
tion within the meaning of the statute for refraining from he matri-
monial relation, both because the absence is justifiable and consented
to. One who has caused a separation by a groundless suit cannot charge
the other spouse with desertion." The time so consumed has been quite
appropriately termed "time out."9
The requirement of good faith as a necessary limitation to the rule
is best calculated to insure justice to both spouses. As was stated by
the Nevw Jersey court in Weigel v. Weigel,'0 "In all the cases which
state the proposition in general terms there is an assumption that the
case which relieves from the duty of cohabitation is one brought in good
faith in order to submit to the courts a condition of facts which the
complainant really believes entitles her to the relief sought. It is un-
doubtedly the injured spouse's right to have a judicial determination
of the action unembarrassed by the adverse presumptions raised by her
continued cohabitation with the other party." Conversely, if the action
is not brought in good faith, it is a fraud on the court which justifies
it in refusing to give any effect to the action.
Ricnan C. GORMLEY
Domestic Relations -The Presumption of the Validity of the Sec-
ond Marriage - The deceased married Mabel Von Pilcher in Lyon
county, Kansas, in 1901. They lived as husband and wife until their
separation in 1925. Sometime thereafter the deceased told his wife that
he had divorced her and, in 1926, relying on the deceased's statement,
Mabel began living with one Hal F. Showers as his wife. On June 21,
1941, the deceased married Mildred Pilcher at Logan county, Utah. One
month later Mildred learned of his prior marriage. During the years
1942 and 1943, Mildred and the deceased lived in California where
Mabel and Hal Showers, holding themselves out as husband and wife,
also lived. The two families became quite well acquainted, and Mabel
claimed that during this time the deceased came to her and told her
that he had never divorced her, and further that she had never divorced
him, nor had she ever been served with divorce papers. Upon his death,
Mildred was appointed administratrix of his estate. Mabel filed suit
to have Mildred removed as administratrix and herself substituted.
7 WIs. STAT. (1947) 247.07(4).
8 75 N.H. 270, 73 At. 30 (1909).
Holmstedt v. Holmstedt, 383 Ill. 290, 49 N.E. (2d) 25 (1943).
10 63 N.J.Eq. 677, 52 At. 1123 (1902).
